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SUMMARY
The largest estuary in the United States, the Chesapeake Bay is a vital 
economic, cultural, and ecological resource for the region and the nation. 
Excess runoff and discharges of nutrients—particularly nitrogen and 
phosphorus—from farms, pavement, wastewater treatment plants 
(WWTPs), and other sources have placed the bay on the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) List of Impaired Waters. This nutrient pollu-
tion is responsible for creating large algal blooms that lead to “dead zones” 
in the bay (Chesapeake Bay Program, 2009b). Despite decades of restora-
tion efforts, progress has been slow, and the rivers and streams that drain 
into the Bay remain polluted (Chesapeake Bay Program, 2009b). 
The proposed “Chesapeake Clean Water and Ecosystem Restoration Act of 
2009” (H.R. 3852/S. 1816) would provide signifi cant new resources and 
new approaches to help restore the bay. Nutrient trading is one such 
approach. In a nutrient trading market, sources that reduce their nutrient 
runoff or discharges below target levels can sell their surplus reductions or 
“credits” to other sources. This approach allows those that can reduce 
nutrients at low cost to sell credits to those facing higher-cost nutrient 
reduction options. Nutrient trading, therefore, could allow sources of 
pollution such as WWTPs and municipal stormwater programs to meet 
their pollution targets in a cost-effective manner and could create new 
revenue opportunities for farmers, entrepreneurs, and others who imple-
ment low-cost pollution reduction practices.
The bill would establish a baywide nutrient trading market for the Chesa-
peake Bay watershed (Figure 1), allowing credits to be exchanged across 
state lines and among the watershed’s nine major river basins. A baywide 
nutrient trading market would build on the existing and pending state-level 
nutrient trading programs in Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West 
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Virginia. A baywide nutrient trading market could help 
states and sectors more cost-effectively achieve court-
ordered nutrient pollution limits called Total Maximum 
Daily Loads (TMDLs) that are being developed by the 
EPA. These TMDLs will set limits on nutrient loads to the 
bay and its tributaries for the agricultural, wastewater, 
municipal stormwater, and other sectors. 
Preliminary analyses indicate that the economic benefi ts of 
a baywide nutrient trading market for nitrogen could be 
signifi cant for the agricultural, wastewater, and municipal 
stormwater sectors in the Chesapeake Bay watershed. 
Depending on credit prices, trading potentially could:
• Generate new revenue for the agricultural sector and 
other credit generators at an amount comparable to 
current levels of annual public funding for agriculture 
conservation cost-share programs for the bay;
• Reduce nitrogen removal costs for some in the wastewa-
ter sector by as much as 60 percent; and
• Save the municipal stormwater sector hundreds of 
millions of dollars per year.
RATIONALE FOR NUTRIENT TRADING
A number of features and benefi ts make nutrient trading an 
attractive approach for helping restore the Chesapeake Bay.
Trading could create revenue opportunities and reduce 
costs. The opportunity for nutrient trading arises because 
large differences in the cost to reduce a pound of nitrogen 
exist among various sectors and practices (Figure 2). In a 
trading market, sources that can reduce nutrients at low 
cost have an economic incentive to make reductions below 
target levels and then sell the credits to those facing higher 
costs. Trading therefore creates new revenue opportunities 
for farmers, entrepreneurs, and others who can generate 
nutrient credits. At the same time, trading allows those 
WWTPs and municipal stormwater programs that face 
higher nutrient reduction costs to save money by purchas-
ing credits to meet a portion of their nutrient reduction 
obligations. As a result, trading could help achieve overall 
nutrient reductions in the Chesapeake Bay watershed in a 
more cost-effective manner.
Note that Figure 2 does not show credit prices in a nutrient 
trading market but, rather, current average costs to reduce a 
pound of nitrogen based on a number of studies. Prices are 
determined by the market dynamics of supply and demand. 
The costs in Figure 2 do not take into account the baseline 
or minimum practices that agriculture will have to imple-
ment prior to selling credits. Subsequent analyses in this 
working paper take baselines into account.
Trading could accelerate nutrient load reductions. 
Nutrient trading encourages identifi cation and adoption of 
the least expensive nutrient reduction practices, many of 
Figure 1 | A Baywide Nutrient Trading Market Would 
Involve the Entire Chesapeake Bay Watershed
Source: Chesapeake Bay Program
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which are frequently faster and easier to implement. By 
achieving the most effi cient, readily available nutrient 
reductions, trading can accelerate progress toward achiev-
ing clean water goals.
The cost-effectiveness of pollution-credit trading 
has been demonstrated. Trading has lowered the cost 
for achieving several air and water pollution goals. The 
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments established an interstate 
trading program for sulfur dioxide emissions that allows 
power plants facing higher pollution reduction costs to 
purchase reductions from power plants facing lower 
pollution reduction costs. The program has reduced the 
cost of compliance by 43 to 55 percent compared to 
achieving the required reductions without trading (Califor-
nia Market Advisory Committee, 2007). 
The state of Connecticut established a nitrogen trading 
program among 79 WWTPs to reduce pollution in the 
western end of Long Island Sound. Trading began in 2001. 
The program is projected to reduce the ultimate cost for the 
WWTPs to meet their waste load allocations under the 
Long Island Sound nitrogen TMDL by approximately 33 
percent (CT DEP, 2009).
There are suffi cient potential nitrogen reductions 
to restore the bay and support nutrient trading. 
The Chesapeake Bay Watershed Model estimates that the 
bay received 284 million pounds of nitrogen from all 
sources in 2008 (Figure 3). This load will have to be 
reduced by 88 million pounds in order to achieve the target 
load of 196 million pounds per year. This target load is the 
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Source: U.S. EPA and Abt Associates, 2009; Wieland, et al., 2009; MDNR, 2008; Stewart, E. A., 2006; WRI analysis using WWTP upgrade costs from 
MDE and VDEQ.
Figure 2 | Nitrogen Reduction Costs Differ Among Sectors and Practices, Creating Economic Opportunities for Credit Trading
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Tributary Strategy load in the Chesapeake Bay Watershed 
Model Phase 5.2.
The Chesapeake Bay Watershed Model indicates that the 
needed 88 million pounds of reduction are available, as well 
as up to an additional 64 million pounds per year if all of 
the practices that have been identifi ed in bay state cleanup 
plans are implemented (Koroncai and Shenk, 2009). These 
additional reductions could be sold as credits. Although not 
all of the 64 million pounds in additional reductions may be 
realized, a portion large enough to support the trading 
market is likely to be achievable. Further nitrogen credits 
could be generated by implementing new, innovative 
practices such as algal turf scrubbing, native oyster aquacul-
ture, and new manure management technologies that are not 
yet included in bay state cleanup plans.
ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF 
BAYWIDE NUTRIENT TRADING
What could be a potential range of economic benefi ts of 
baywide nutrient trading to the agricultural, wastewater, 
and municipal stormwater sectors? To answer this question 
and provide preliminary fi gures to get a sense of possible 
“scale,” the World Resources Institute (WRI) modeled 
three scenarios of a mature market. These scenarios are not 
intended to be predictive but rather to identify possible low 
and high ends of a range. Focusing solely on nitrogen, 
these scenarios combine estimated average credit prices, 
estimated credit supply, and estimated credit demand. All 
scenarios refl ect nitrogen loads that are delivered to the 
mainstem of the Chesapeake Bay. The scenarios use the 
Chesapeake Bay Program’s Chesapeake Bay Watershed 
Model, available nutrient reduction cost information from a 
range of studies, expert interviews, and other data sources. 
2008 annual 
load
Load reduction to 
meet target load
Target
load
* Innovative practices such as algal turf scrubbing and new manure management technologies are not currently listed in state Tributary Strategy 
implementation plans and their possible nutrient reductions are not yet quantified.
Source: Chesapeake Bay Watershed Model Phase 5.2, 2009a.
Figure 3 | Sufficient Nitrogen Reduction Opportunities Exist to Support Trading
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Table 1 summarizes the three credit prices while the 
appendix provides background information on assumed 
credit supply and credit demand. The estimated credit 
prices in Table 1 are the average for the scenario’s credit 
sales, recognizing that prices in an operational market 
would fl uctuate over time in response to the forces of 
supply and demand. The appendix also discusses the 
approach for handling trading ratios (uncertainty, reserve, 
and retirement ratios) in this analysis. 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO THE AGRICULTURAL 
SECTOR
A baywide nutrient trading market could generate eco-
nomic benefi ts for the region’s agricultural sector.
Nitrogen credit trading could generate $45-$300 
million per year in revenue, an amount compa-
rable to current agriculture conservation cost-
share programs in the bay. Farmers could earn 
Scenario
Credit 
price Description Source
1 $8/lb Represents a price within the price range of historical nitrogen credit transactions in the nascent Pennsylvania 
pre-TMDL nutrient credit market between 2006 and 2009. Credit prices in a mature baywide nitrogen trading 
market would likely be higher since demand for credits would be higher under a TMDL and growth pressure.
PA DEP, 2010
2 $20/lb Represents an estimated minimum price at which farmers may be willing to sell credits. This estimate is 
based on annualized implementation, operations and maintenance, and opportunity costs for four agricultural 
practices (i.e., early cover crops, forest buffers, riparian grass buffers, constructed wetlands) that are 
implemented after a farm’s baseline has been met. This estimate reflects the average of these costs and 
practices across five bay states.
MDNR, 2008; PA DEP, 
2004; VDEQ, 2006; 
Wainger and King, 2007; 
Wieland et al., 2009
3 $50/lb Represents a scenario where municipal separate storm sewer systems (MS4s) can buy credits and therefore 
greatly increase demand because of the high costs they are seeking to avoid. The WWTPs in the market are 
those facing high upgrade costs ($47/lb), and the $50/lb credit price exceeds their willingness to pay. The 
MS4s in the market are facing retrofit costs of $200+/lb and would be willing to pay the credit price of $50/
lb. If credit supply were short of demand, MS4s could generally outbid WWTPs for most available credits.
MDE, 2009; VDEQ, 2006
Table 1 | Estimated Average Nitrogen Credit Prices Used in the Scenarios
180
41
139
45
Scenario 1 Government agriculture conserva-
tion cost-share program funding 
in the Chesapeake Bay 
watershed* (FY 2009)
State cost-share programs
Federal Farm Bill conservation programs
Potential annual revenue in a baywide nitrogen trading program
(depending on credit price and volume)
168
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Figure 4 | Potential Annual Revenue from Baywide Trading of Nitrogen Credits Could Be Comparable to Current Agriculture 
Conservation Cost-Share Programs
Million dollars per year
*Farm Bill programs include EQIP, AMA, FRPP, WRP, CRP, CREP, and the Chesapeake Bay Watershed Program. State cost-share includes funding for the 
Chesapeake Bay watershed portions of MD, NY, PA, and VA. Data for the bay portions of DE and WV are not available.
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2009; Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 2010; WRI analysis using data from the Chesapeake Bay Watershed Model Phase 5.2
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additional revenue if they sell nutrient credits generated by 
implementing practices that reduce fertilizer or manure 
runoff beyond baseline levels (Box 1). Preliminary 
scenario analyses suggest that the potential annual revenue 
from selling nitrogen credits in a baywide nutrient trading 
market could be comparable to the amount of public funds 
for agriculture conservation cost-share programs in the 
Chesapeake Bay (Figure 4). A trading market could 
generate an estimated $45 million to $300 million per year, 
the amount varying with average credit price and the 
number of credits sold (see Tables 1 and 2 for details 
underlying the scenarios). In comparison, the combined 
state and federal cost-share funds for farms in the Chesa-
peake Bay watershed was approximately $180 million in 
fi scal year 2009.
Nitrogen reductions in these scenarios come from imple-
mentation of practices that have been identifi ed in bay state 
cleanup plans. The scenarios do not assume maximum 
implementation of all agriculture practices identifi ed as 
reducing nitrogen below the Tributary Strategy target in the 
Chesapeake Bay Watershed Model Phase 5.2. Rather, 
credits supplied and sold in scenarios 1, 2, and 3 equate to 
22 percent, 33 percent, and 24 percent, respectively, of 
post-Tributary Strategy nitrogen reductions possible in the 
agricultural sector according to the bay model.
Nonpoint source credit-generation opportunities are likely 
to extend beyond “traditional” farm practices. A trading 
market might stimulate implementation of innovative 
nutrient removal approaches such as algal turf scrubbing 
and manure waste-to-energy technologies. Such 
approaches could involve the agricultural sector in the 
form of land leases, manure sales, and other activities. 
Nutrient trading could complement public agricul-
ture conservation cost-share funding. The fi nancial 
incentives from cost-share programs and nutrient trading 
markets are complementary. Farmers could use state and 
federal agriculture conservation cost-share funds to help 
fi nance baseline practices that are to be implemented before 
farmers can participate in nutrient credit markets. Farmers 
then can earn revenue by selling nutrient credits generated 
by additional practices that yield further nutrient reductions. 
Farmers throughout the Chesapeake Bay water-
shed could benefi t from baywide nutrient trading. 
The ability of a farm to generate credits will vary by farm 
type, soil, slope, location, best management practices 
implemented, and other factors. Preliminary analyses 
indicate that many farms (but not all) in each state and in 
each existing state trading basin could benefi t from selling 
nitrogen credits. Figure 5 summarizes potential annual 
revenue per state from nitrogen credit sales in each of the 
three scenarios. Figure 6 summarizes potential annual 
revenue per basin in each of the three scenarios. 
Figures 5 and 6 are based on the simplifying assumption 
that total revenue from credit sales is distributed in 
proportion to the state’s or river basin’s relative contribu-
tion to total potential nutrient reductions as provided by the 
Chesapeake Bay Watershed Model. To refi ne this assess-
ment, further analysis is underway to account for potential 
differences in credit generation costs and abilities among 
basins and states.
Box 1 | What is a Baseline? 
A baseline is a level of annual nutrient runoff or discharge 
that a source must meet before it is eligible to sell nutrient 
credits. Sources generate credits by reducing nutrient 
runoff or discharges below the baseline. For a WWTP, the 
baseline would be the annual waste load stipulated in its 
discharge permit. For a farm, the baseline could corre-
spond to an individual farm’s share of the overall state 
reductions needed from the agricultural sector in order to 
achieve a water quality goal such as those specified in a 
state Tributary Strategy or TMDL. Baseline requirements 
may differ by state.
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* Estimates for all states except New York are based on the Chesapeake Bay Watershed Model phase 5.2. Projections for New York are being revised in this model 
phase, thus this analysis uses phase 4.3 for New York. 
Source: Chesapeake Bay Watershed Model Phase 5.2 (for DE, MD, PA, VA, and WV), 2009a; Chesapeake Bay Watershed Model Phase 4.3 (for NY), 2008. 
Figure 5 | Farmers in Each Bay State Could Earn Revenue From Selling Nitrogen Credits in a Baywide Trading Market
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*  Estimates for all states except New York are based on the Chesapeake Bay Watershed Model Phase 5.2. Projections for New York are being revised in this 
model phase, thus this analysis utilizes Phase 4.3 for New York. 
Source:  Chesapeake Bay Watershed Model Phase 5.2 (for DE, MD, PA, VA, and WV), 2009a; Chesapeake Bay Watershed Model Phase 4.3 (for NY), 2008.
Figure 6 | Farmers in Each Existing Bay Trading Basin Could Earn Revenue From Selling Nitrogen Credits in a Baywide Trading Market
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POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO THE WASTEWATER 
SECTOR
A baywide nutrient trading program could yield a number 
of benefi ts to WWTPs that face obligations to reduce their 
nutrient discharges. 
Nutrient trading could yield nearly 60 percent cost 
savings for those WWTPs facing expensive 
upgrades. WWTPs within the bay watershed face a range 
of costs to remove nitrogen through treatment process 
upgrades. Some plants face low costs, some high. WWTPs 
facing high costs could meet some or all of their obliga-
tions less expensively and more rapidly by purchasing 
credits from farms, entrepreneurs, or other WWTPs that 
have lower nutrient reduction costs. 
A WRI analysis of 109 WWTPs in Maryland and Virginia 
(comparable data from other states was not available) 
ranging in design capacity from 0.1 to 180 million gallons 
per day found that 40 plants face treatment process upgrade 
costs greater than an assumed credit price of $20 per pound 
of nitrogen (scenario 2). The weighted average annualized 
upgrade cost of these 40 plants is $47 per pound. Thus, if 
the credit price were $20 per pound, then purchasing credits 
would save WWTPs facing similar upgrade costs 57 percent 
relative to implementing treatment process upgrades (Figure 
7). To the degree that the Maryland and Virginia WWTPs 
are reasonably representative of WWTPs in the bay states in 
terms of planning, design, and construction costs, this 
savings rate is indicative of the potential size of savings for 
other, similarly high-cost WWTPs in the region.
Trading could generate revenue for some WWTPs. 
WWTPs with low nutrient reduction costs could earn 
revenue by reducing discharges below target levels and then 
selling the surplus reductions as credits to other WWTPS, 
municipal separate storm sewer systems (MS4s), or others. 
Trading could help accommodate growth. Maryland, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia adopted policies 
that provide no nutrient allocations to new or expanding 
WWTPs. Without the availability of nutrient credits to 
offset their discharges, these new and expanded plants could 
not be built and population growth could not be accommo-
dated. Trading would allow growth to continue without 
increasing the amount of nutrients delivered to the bay. 
Trading could benefi t water utility ratepayers. 
Ratepayers would save money on their utility bills when 
public-owned WWTPs meet nutrient reduction obligations 
at lower cost through nutrient trading.
POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO THE STORMWATER 
SECTOR
The cost to reduce nitrogen from stormwater systems 
through retrofi ts is among the most expensive measures in 
the Tributary Strategies (Figure 2). A baywide nutrient 
trading program could signifi cantly lower costs for 
municipal stormwater programs throughout the Chesa-
peake Bay to achieve their target nutrient reductions.
Nitrogen removal cost 
via upgrades for 
high-cost WWTPs
Source: WRI analysis based on data from MDE, 2009, and VDEQ, 2006.
Figure 7 | Wastewater Treatment Plants Facing Expensive 
Upgrades Could Realize Significant Savings By Purchasing 
Nitrogen Credits
Dollars per pound of annual nitrogen reduction
Cost of credit
purchase
47
20
57% savings
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Trading could complement existing approaches for 
meeting stormwater nutrient reduction targets. 
Trading can be an additional tool to help achieve target 
stormwater nutrient reductions. It can augment local 
stormwater programs in the following way. Most, if not all 
stormwater projects are done for local fl ood control, water 
quality, and stream restoration purposes. The need to 
reduce nutrient loadings to the bay is an additional goal or 
requirement that local jurisdictions must consider. The 
projects done for local purposes may or may not achieve 
enough reductions in delivered nutrient loads to the bay to 
meet these goals or requirements. Trading can come into 
play if they do not. If local jurisdictions have the option of 
covering their load reduction “shortfalls “ by purchasing 
credits in the baywide nutrient market, they could save 
signifi cant amounts of money compared to installing 
additional stormwater system retrofi ts solely for the 
purpose of reducing loads to the bay.  
Nutrient trading could save MS4s hundreds of 
millions of dollars per year. Figure 8 summarizes 
potential savings to the Chesapeake Bay’s MS4s of trading 
relative to no trading. In a “no trading” scenario, MS4s 
implement stormwater retrofi ts to meet 100 percent of their 
targets. The estimated average stormwater retrofi t cost in 
this analysis is $200 per pound of nitrogen. This cost 
refl ects the annualized capital, maintenance, and operation 
costs of stormwater practices such as urban fi ltration, urban 
fi ltering, and wet ponds (Chesapeake Bay Program, 2004a 
and 2004b), adjusted for infl ation and the latest stormwater 
practice effi ciencies. There is little present literature on the 
cost per pound of nutrient removal from stormwater 
retrofi ts. This cost is most likely at the low end of the range 
for stormwater and therefore the total estimated savings 
may be conservative.
In a “trading” scenario, MS4s are assumed to purchase 
nitrogen credits to meet 30, 40, 50, 60, or 70 percent of 
their nitrogen reduction targets and implement stormwater 
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0
30%
Source: Chesapeake Bay Program, 2004b; WRI analysis using data from the Chesapeake Bay Watershed Model Phase 5.2.
Figure 8 | MS4s Could Realize Significant Savings By Purchasing Nitrogen Credits Instead of Solely Relying on Stormwater Retrofits
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retrofi ts for the remainder. The analysis assumes that MS4s 
would not purchase credits to meet 100 percent of reduc-
tion targets since MS4s will implement stormwater retrofi ts 
to address local water runoff and quality issues in accor-
dance with local stormwater needs and priorities.  
Figure 8 highlights several points. First, MS4s could save 
hundreds of millions of dollars per year if they purchase 
credits in lieu of implementing retrofi ts to meet at least a 
portion of their nitrogen reduction targets. Second, the 
relative total savings would be on the order of 25 percent to 
63 percent. Third, the amount and percent of savings would 
increase with increasing “credit utilization”—the use of 
credits to meet MS4 nitrogen reduction targets. 
Increasing credit utilization is central to reducing 
MS4 costs. Sensitivity analyses indicate that an increase 
in credit utilization has a much greater impact on total 
savings than does a proportional change in credit price. 
Therefore, a baywide nutrient trading market that facili-
tates participation of MS4s would maximize potential cost 
savings and help achieve bay restoration in the most 
cost-effective manner. 
SOME ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED
Recent discussions about Chesapeake Bay nutrient trading 
highlight questions about how trading would work, as well 
as some concerns. All such questions and concerns need to 
be addressed as trading program development moves 
forward. The state trading programs are relatively new and 
will evolve and improve as the states gain experience with 
them. Design of a baywide trading program has not yet 
begun. As program development goes forward, there will 
be ample opportunity to answer all such questions and fully 
consider all issues and concerns that arise.
The following preliminary responses address some key 
questions that have been raised:
How can water quality trading deal with uncertainty? 
Nutrient trading programs must address the scientifi c 
uncertainties associated with the discharge of nonpoint 
source nutrient loads. The nonpoint source uncertainty can 
be dealt with in a number of ways such as monitoring to 
verify actual loads, applying discounts to calculated 
nutrient reductions to ensure environmental integrity, using 
approved loading rates, applying nutrient removal rates on 
land management practices (i.e., rates and effi ciencies 
based on peer-reviewed scientifi c analyses), and directly 
measuring mass loads removed from the water body. 
Whatever the source of the uncertainty, the trading 
program design should incorporate measures to address it. 
The measures chosen will depend on the nature of the 
nonpoint sources involved. Uncertainty ratios, in which 
more credits are required than can be used by the buyer, are 
one method of accounting for uncertainty. In general, 
proposed trades involving innovative or “unproven” credit 
generation methods will require greater attention to the 
uncertainty issues in the credit certifi cation, trade approval, 
and annual verifi cation processes.
How can trading programs ensure that local water 
quality is protected? When a WWTP buys nutrient 
credits, it can then discharge a higher nutrient load to its 
receiving water than if it had upgraded its facility to 
achieve additional nutrient removal. There is concern that 
these local discharges could result in local water quality 
impairment (i.e., violation of a water quality standard). 
To protect against local impairments, both EPA’s nutrient 
trading policy and the Clean Water Act prohibit trades that 
would result in the violation of water quality standards. 
Existing permitting requirements for point sources—includ-
ing WWTPs, municipal stormwater discharges, and 
concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs)—should 
ensure that impairments do not result from trades. For 
example, a WWTP buying credits will have the trade 
incorporated into its discharge permit by the state regulatory 
agency. A required component of this process is an evalua-
tion by the permit-issuing agency of the water quality 
impact of the proposed discharge. Regulatory agencies 
typically use water quality modeling to make this assess-
ment, and if the modeling shows that the proposed dis-
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charge would result in violations of a water quality stan-
dard, the proposed discharge would not be permitted. The 
Clean Water Act forbids the permitting authority from 
issuing a permit that would result in violations of a water 
quality standard. Therefore, an impairment would not occur 
as long as the required permitting procedures are followed.
How can compliance risk be reduced for regulated 
credit buyers? Some regulated credit buyers might be 
hesitant to buy nutrient credits out of concern that if the 
credits do not materialize, they will be in violation of their 
discharge permit and face a federal or state enforcement 
action under the Clean Water Act. While this legal liability 
cannot be transferred to the supplier of the credits, there are 
market design features that can signifi cantly reduce this risk 
for credit buyers. For instance, the buyer could be given a 
reconciliation period after the end of the year during which 
it could acquire credits (generated in the same year) from 
other sources if necessary to cover any shortfall. If this 
reconciliation period were coupled with a reliable insurance 
pool of credits maintained for just such a purpose, then the 
risk of noncompliance is almost negligible.
Credit buyers may not want to interact with many 
small, individual credit sellers. How can this be 
avoided? Many buyers would fi nd it unattractive to 
contract with many small credit suppliers because it would 
increase administrative and transaction costs, increase the 
likelihood of contract defaults, and create large demands 
on staff resources. An alternative would be to contract with 
a single supplier that essentially functions as a credit 
retailer. Such entities exist. Commonly known as “credit 
aggregators,” they can provide a number of important func-
tions and benefi ts including: 
• Acquiring credits from farmers and landowners;
• Providing technical assistance and fi nancing to credit 
generators;
• Ensuring that all federal, state, and local requirements 
are met; and
• Assuming risks and liabilities for credit supply.
CONCLUSION
Establishing a baywide nutrient trading market could help 
reduce nutrient pollution in the Chesapeake Bay in the 
most cost-effective, timely manner. It could allow sources 
of pollution such as WWTPs and municipal stormwater 
programs to inexpensively meet their pollution targets and 
could create new revenue opportunities for farmers, 
entrepreneurs, and others who implement low-cost 
pollution reduction practices.
Preliminary analyses indicate that the economic benefi ts of 
a baywide nutrient trading market for nitrogen could be 
signifi cant. Municipalities could save hundreds of millions 
of dollars each year on stormwater nutrient reductions. 
Wastewater treatment plants could see nitrogen reduction 
costs lowered by as much as 60 percent in some cases. The 
agricultural sector could earn $45 million to $300 million 
per year in new revenue, an amount comparable to current 
levels of annual public funding for agriculture conservation 
cost-share programs for the bay. In short, nutrient trading 
could harness market forces to help save the bay.
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APPENDIX
Estimated annual credit supply
In the three scenarios, credits are nitrogen reductions 
generated by a variety of agriculture practices after a 
farm’s baseline has been met. Based on the Chesapeake 
Bay Watershed Model, the number of possible credits 
refl ects nitrogen reductions from agriculture beyond the 
level required to meet the Chesapeake Bay Tributary 
Strategy. These reductions come from implementation of 
practices that have been identifi ed in bay state cleanup 
plans. Nonpoint source credit-generation opportunities are 
likely to extend beyond “traditional” farm practices, too. A 
trading market might stimulate implementation of innova-
tive nutrient removal approaches such as algal turf scrub-
bing and manure waste-to-energy technologies. Such 
approaches could involve agriculture in the form of land 
leases, manure sales, and other activities. 
The scenarios do not assume maximum implementation of 
all agriculture practices identifi ed as reducing nitrogen 
below the Tributary Strategy target in the Chesapeake Bay 
Watershed Model Phase 5.2. Rather, credits supplied and 
sold in scenarios 1, 2, and 3 equate to 22 percent, 33 
percent, and 24 percent, respectively, of post Tributary 
Strategy nitrogen reductions possible in the agricultural 
sector according to the bay model.
Estimated annual credit demand
The scenarios assume that WWTPs and MS4s are the 
major buyers of nitrogen credits. Table 2 outlines three 
possible amounts of credits purchased per year. These 
estimates are conservative in that possible credit demand 
by MS4s due to urban/suburban growth and expanded 
development is not included due to insuffi cient data at the 
time of publication. Likewise, the scenarios do not include 
possible demand by WWTPs if policies were to change in 
Maryland and Virginia to allow WWTPs to purchase 
credits in lieu of implementing upgrades.
Handling of trading ratios in the economic analysis
The analysis of potential credit prices and revenue associ-
ated with credit sales does not refl ect the potential impact of 
the uncertainty, retirement, and reserve ratios that are 
required by the current state trading programs. One reason 
Scenario
Number of 
Credits 
Purchased 
Per Year Description Source
1 5.6 million WWTPs: WWTPs in Pennsylvania and West Virginia that are projected to exceed their waste load 
allocations over the coming decade buy credits from nonpoint sources after exhausting credit 
supply from other WWTPs. WWTPs in Maryland do not purchase credits since current state policy 
requires WWTPs to upgrade to best available technology. Virginia WWTPs trade with other WWTPs 
and do not purchase nonpoint source credits in accordance with current regulatory restrictions.
MS4s: MS4s throughout the bay watershed buy credits to meet 40 percent of their load 
reductions needed to meet Tributary Strategy goals. 
Selman et. al., 2009
Chesapeake Bay Watershed 
Model Phase 5.2
2 8.4 million WWTPs: Same as above but in addition new and expanding WWTPs in all bay states buy credits 
to offset expansion. Estimated expansion is based on WWTP capacity by river basin, projected 
population growth, and 100 gallons/day/person.
MS4s: MS4s throughout the bay watershed buy credits to meet 70 percent of their load 
reductions needed to meet Tributary Strategy goals.
Selman et. al., 2009
Chesapeake Bay Watershed 
Model Phase 5.2
3 6.0 million WWTPs: Only new and expanding facilities purchase credits. WWTPs with existing waste load 
allocations choose to implement upgrades instead of buying credits.
MS4s: MS4s throughout the bay watershed buy credits to meet 70 percent of their load 
reductions needed to meet Tributary Strategy goals.
MDE, 2009; VDEQ, 2006
Chesapeake Bay Watershed 
Model Phase 5.2
Table 2 | Estimated Nitrogen Credit Demand Used in the Three Scenarios
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is that the states vary widely in the ratios they have adopted. 
For instance, Virginia requires an uncertainty ratio of 2:1 (a 
regulated buyer must purchase 2 credits (or “offsets”) for 
every 1 pound of discharged nitrogen it needs to offset) for 
all trades involving nonpoint sources, and West Virginia has 
proposed a ratio of 1.2:1. Pennsylvania does not require an 
uncertainty ratio but establishes a credit reserve ratio of 
1.1:1. Maryland requires no uncertainty ratio if the best 
management practice or practice that is certifi ed to generate 
the credits is one for which the Chesapeake Bay Program 
has established long-term average effi ciencies that have 
been incorporated into the Bay Watershed Model. These 
effi ciencies are the result of a rigorous scientifi c peer-
review process that also considered the uncertainty associ-
ated with each practice and set the effi ciencies in a conser-
vative manner based on the uncertainty. Hence, uncertainty 
has already been addressed for these BMPs and uncertainty 
ratios applied to individual trades involving them may not 
be warranted. If a baywide trading program were in 
operation in the future, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and West 
Virginia could potentially decide to eliminate the universal 
requirement for an uncertainty ratio.
Likewise, reserve and retirement ratios vary among states. 
Pennsylvania requires a 10 percent reserve/retirement ratio, 
Maryland 10 percent (retirement only), and West Virginia 
20 percent. Virginia does not require one. As with uncer-
tainty ratios, the states may choose to modify their existing 
requirements in light of a baywide trading program.
Uncertainty, reserve, and retirement ratios will likely have 
some impact on the economics of nutrient trading under a 
baywide program. This analysis does not currently address 
these impacts because of the wide variability of state 
requirements and uncertainty about the retention of such 
requirements by the states if a baywide program were in 
place and perhaps altered or eliminated the need for some 
of them.
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